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Loyola Consumer Law Reporter

DUMPING DISCIPLINE: A CONSUMER PROTECTION MODEL
FOR REGULATING LAWYERS
by Deborah M. Chalfie*
[T]he public incorrectly perceives
the [lawyer disciplinary]system as
a consumer protection agency

which it is not.
-State Bar of Texas,
to a legal consumer'
I. Introduction
More than twenty years ago, the
American Bar Association (ABA)
made its first-ever national study
of lawyer discipline systems. It
concluded that the state of lawyer
discipline was "scandalous":
After three years of studying lawyer discipline throughout the country, this Committee must report the
existence of a scandalous situation that requires the immediate attention of the profession. With few exceptions,
the prevailing attitude of lawyers toward disciplinary enforcement ranges from apathy to outright hostility.
Disciplinary action is practically nonexistent in many jurisdictions.. 2
The ABA further concluded that
"[t]he profession does not have
much time remaining to reform its
own disciplinary structure. Public
dissatisfaction is increasing." '3
Since the time of the ABA study,
numerous reforms have been
adopted. Funding for discipline
agencies has increased. Professional personnel have largely replaced
all-volunteer staffs. Enforcement,
once the domain of local grievance
committees, has become increasingly centralized in statewide agencies. Non-lawyers have been added
to agency governing boards and
grievance panels. These and other
subsequent reforms, however,
have not quelled public criticism of
the lawyer discipline system.
If anything, criticism has intensified; from a consumer's point of4
view, nothing has really changed.
In most states, the discipline process is conducted in secret until
final sanctions, if any, are im4

posed. The discipline rules still do
not cover most consumer complaints. Of the more than 100,000
complaints registered against lawyers each year, more than 90-95
percent are dismissed.' When a
complaint is not dismissed, the
system grants the accused lawyer
almost all of the procedural rights
of a criminal defendant. When
misconduct is found, secret discipline and light penalties prevail.
Finally, the entire discipline system is designed, run and supervised by lawyers. Public participation in discipline policy-making
and enforcement is rare.
However, one thing has
changed. In the late 1970s, consumers of legal services organized.
Citizen activists pressured state
bar associations and discipline
agencies to make simple reforms.
The consumers demonstrated, testified, held speak-outs and press
conferences, and pushed for legislative action. In the face of such
challenges, the ABA formed a second lawyer discipline commission
in 1989. The commission, headed
by the now late Professor Robert
McKay, was charged with studying
and evaluating the progress made
since the first study of lawyer discipline. This time, unlike during the
ABA's first study, a great number
of consumers were in attendance.
In five public hearings around the
country, consumers and consumer
advocates voiced their concerns to
the McKay Commission. Hundreds of consumers told horror
stories about their experiences
with the attorney discipline system.
The main problem is not that
discipline systems are not working
well enough. Rather the entire discipline model-the regulatory
structure, objectives, responses
and process which constitute lawyer discipline-make the discipline model itself the problem.
Even if discipline agencies operated perfectly, the discipline model
largely ignores consumer concerns.

Public discontent with lawyer discipline stems from the fact that
lawyer discipline systems are indeed not consumer protection
agencies.
This article explains why discipline will never work for consumers, and what kind of regulatory
scheme should replace it. Part II of
the article describes and critiques
the current system, the so-called
"discipline model" of lawyer regulation, from a consumer point of
view. Because its structure, objectives, responses, and process for
dealing with lawyer misconduct
are self-serving and ultimately unresponsive to consumers' needs
and expectations, the article argues
that discipline is simply the wrong
model for regulating lawyers. Part
III of the article outlines an alternative model for regulating lawyers
that is solidly grounded in consumer protection principles. It identifies the concrete rights consumers
need and deserve, the responses
and remedies that ought to be
available to consumers, and the
*B.A., Ohio State University- J.D., George
Washington University National Law Center; LL.M., Georgetown University Law
Center.
In 1990, the author originally wrote
about this subject in the form of testimony
for HALT-An Organization of Americans
for Legal Reform, when she was their Legislative Director. That original testimony,
which was presented to the American Bar
Association Commission on Evaluation of
DisciplinaryEnforcement, has been updated
for purposes of this article. Although this
articlespeaks in terms of lawyer regulation,
the basic precepts enumerated here apply
with equalforce to the regulationof nonlawyer legal service providers.
HALT is the only national organization
of legalconsumers working to make the legal
system more accessible, and lawyers more
accountable, to the public. The authorgratefully acknowledges HAL T's policy andadvocacy work on lawyer regulation over several
years, as well as the comments ofpresent and
former HALT staffpersons Kay Ostberg,
Glenn Nishimura,Karen Winfield, andJohn
Pomeranz on the original testimony. In
addition, a former HALT staffperson, Carol
Bergman, conductedmuch ofthe researchon
other consumer protection models and systems that underpins this article.
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process by which consumers
should obtain these remedies.
In May, 1991, the ABA's Commission on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement (the McKay
Commission) issued a report of its
findings and recommendations.
This article therefore concludes
with a summary of those recommendations as well as some predictions for what will happen when
the ABA House of Delegates takes
up the recommendations in February, 1992. Because of the ABA's
influence on actual state discipline
rules and operations, its decision
regarding the Commission's recommendations will affect the lives
of legal consumers for years to
come.
II.The Discipline Model
A. The Wrong Objectives:
6
Maintaining Ethics
Consumers have long criticized
attorney discipline agencies for being unresponsive to consumer
complaints, and every study conducted to date has reached the
same conclusion.7 The main reason discipline agencies ignore most
consumer complaints is that a huge
disparity exists between the type of
complaints clients make to discipline agencies versus the type of
complaints upon which the8 agencies are empowered to act.
Lawyers and judges are in the
best position to observe lawyer
misconduct and have an ethical
obligation to report it. Yet, the
overwhelming majority of the
complaints made to discipline
agencies are filed by clients rather
than lawyers. 9 Clients mostly com-

plain about incompetence, neglect,
and overcharging. 10 In other
words, clients tend to complain
about the contractual aspects of the
lawyer-client relationship: Was the
work performed well? Was it performed on time? Was it performed
at the agreed-upon, or a reasonable, price?
Yet, discipline agencies act on
only a fraction of these complaints.
Nationwide, more than ninety percent of all discipline complaints
are dismissed."I The bulk of these
complaints are dismissed at the
screening stage because they are
considered outside the agency's jurisdiction, which is confined to
Volume 4 Number I/Fall, 1991

enforcing the ethical rules that govern lawyers. 12 Thus, even if all the
complaints about overcharging,
neglect, and incompetence are
true, they state no violation of the
ethical rules and are therefore dismissed.' 3 Yet the bar points to the
mere existence of the lawyer discipline system as the justification for
resisting the development of additional regulatory schemes.
The stated purpose of the discipline model is to "educate, investigate and, if necessary, discipline
lawyers whose conduct falls below
the established minimum levels of
the ethical rules governing the profession."' 4 According to this standard, "unethical" is understood to
mean bad moral character in the
most general sense, and refers to
those who intentionally commit
immoral acts.' 5 The prevailing
mindset in discipline agencies is
that such villains are believed to be
few in number 16 compared to the
vast majority of lawyers. By weeding out and expelling 7 from the
barrel those few bad apples who
violate the minimum standards,
discipline keeps the rest of the
profession ethically clean.' 8
The discipline model's narrow
focus is illustrated in the three to
five percent of the cases in which
lawyers are actually disciplined.
Convictions for crimes in general,
such as for tax evasion or drug
offenses, and criminal-like conduct, such as misappropriation of
client funds, are among the most
common bases for the imposition
of discipline.' 9 Discipline for soliciting cases (ambulance-chasing)
and aggressive or distasteful advertising practices are a somewhat
smaller, though well-publicized,
staple of grievance committee activity. 20
Clients understandably think
"ethical" means treating clients
well. After all, legal ethics, which
are contained in state codes of
professional responsibility, are the
only regulatory rules that lawyers
must follow. In addition, virtually
all of the rules are phrased in
public protection terms. However,
when the content of the ethical
rules themselves and the manner in
which they are interpreted are analyzed, "ethical" seems to relate
only to upholding the profession's

public image and economic status.
For instance, some of the rules
condemn behavior that suggests
bad moral character-felonies of
any sort, fraud, theft, and other
acts of "moral turpitude" commit21
ted against clients or others.
These rules are the essence of what
lawyers mean by "ethics." These
rules, however, amount to little
more than proscriptions against
crime, a form of protection that
consumers already have which
yields little concrete benefit to
those who have been harmed. Other rules prohibit lawyers from engaging in the unauthorized practice
of law (or helping others do so) and
strictly limit advertising and the
solicitation of cases.2 2 Though
couched in consumer protection
terms, these rules have consistently
been criticized by consumers and
others 23 as protecting the profession at the expense of the public by
insulating lawyers from competition.
Of course, the rules of professional responsibility also contain
many provisions directly addressing the treatment of clients. Lawyers are supposed to be loyal to
their clients and zealously represent a client's interests. This means
that lawyers are not supposed to
neglect cases, perform incompe24
tently, or overcharge their clients.
However, these rules contain no
meaningful standards 25 and are
therefore of little discernible effect.
Thus, the rules are interpreted to
proscribe only the most blatant,
extreme instances of abuse. To rise
to the occasion of a disciplinary
violation, the neglect must be repeated or intentional, the overcharge must be unconscionable,
26
and the negligence must be gross.
Consequently, complaints under
such provisions are routinely trivialized and discredited by discipline agencies as27mere communication problems.

Consumers complain when a
lawyer bills more per hour than the
client makes in a day, or even a
week, and then fails to do the work.
This forces the client to find and
pay another lawyer to do the same
preparatory work the first one was
already paid to do. Consumers
complain when lawyers fail to up(continued on page 6)
5
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date them on the case, return their
calls, or make time to meet with
the consumer. Consumers complain when they are issued a final
bill of 50-500 percent more than
the original estimate. Consumers
complain when they learn at trial
that the lawyer failed to follow-up
on the client's suggestions for
sources of relevant evidence. Consumers complain when the lawyer
keeps asking for continuances and
never seems prepared to move
forward.
If a car mechanic did the equivalent of any of these things-took
money without fixing the car,
charged five times more than the
original estimate, failed to call and
let the consumer know when the
car was ready, delayed the pick-up
time repeatedly, or repaired the car
incorrectly-the consumer would
not consider such problems a mere
breakdown in communications.
These complaints address the essence of the buyer-seller contract.
Having the wrong objectivemaintaining minimum ethical
standards-inevitably leads to
misguided rules and enforcement
priorities. Although keeping the
profession ethical in some lofty
sense may arguably be a worthwhile goal, it is practically irrelevant to consumers' needs in the
context of the lawyer-client relationship. When rules addressing
the treatment of clients are either
nonexistent or trivialized to the
point of nonenforcement, the only
operative parts of the system left
are the parts that protect the profession's image. It may be comforting to know that your lawyer does
not possess a police record, but it
would be equally comforting to
know that your lawyer is legally
required to complete the work she
or he was hired to do competently,
promptly, and economically.
B. The Wrong Response: License
Tinkering
The discipline model's incorrect
objective of maintaining minimum
ethical standards rather than protecting legal consumers results in
the wrong response: discipline. As
its name suggests, discipline does
6

more to punish a bad lawyer than
to resolve and remedy a client's
complaint. Temporary or permanent revocation of a lawyer's license to practice law is intended to
rid the profession of bad apples
and to deter others from misconduct. Even the much-used 28 penalty of a reprimand or admonition is
punitive in nature, like a scolding
or a demerit on the attorney's
record (or off-the-record, in the
case of private reprimands).

Discipline does more to
punish a bad lawyer than to
resolve and remedy a
client's complaint.
These license-tinkering mechanisms are not totally devoid of
public benefit. Certainly, the public prefers to avoid outright thieves
and those who habitually abandon
their clients. To the extent these
menaces are indeed removed, discipline protects consumers from
future acts of wrongdoing in the
same way that putting a criminal in
jail helps protect potential victims
from that criminal. But, just as
jailing a criminal does absolutely
nothing of consequence for a criminal's past victims, the discipline
system does nothing of consequence for a lawyer's past victims.

Restitution, specific
performance, damages, and
other kinds of relief that
complaining consumers often
deserve rarely accompany the
imposition of discipline.
Absent within the discipline
model are two key features of any
adequate consumer protection system: dispute resolution and redress. Although these two features
are often related, they represent
distinctly different consumer
needs. All dissatisfied customers
need dispute resolution, particularly those who wish to maintain
an ongoing relationship with their
lawyer. Only those who have suffered a loss of some sort need
redress. The discipline model is
ill-equipped to provide either.
Most complaints are dismissed
and therefore go unresolved. More

to the point, restitution, specific
performance, damages, and other
kinds of relief that complaining
consumers often deserve rarely accompany the imposition of discipline.
Those consumers who want redress are typically told to go find
yet another lawyer and sue for
malpractice or breach of contract.
Malpractice lawsuits are no answer, however, because their practical utility for consumers is largely
a figment of lawyers' imagination.
The difficulty in finding new counsel to take on a malpractice case
against a fellow lawyer, the time
involved, the cost of bringing suit
in comparison to the amount at
stake, and the complexity and risk
that must be overcome to win,2 9 all
combine to make lawyer malpractice litigation an impossibility for
most consumers. Though slightly
less risky, breach of contract litigation still involves most of the same
insurmountable hurdles.
Malpractice litigation suffers
from the same deviance 30 orientation as discipline. That is, legal
standards in malpractice litigation
assume that most lawyers are competent, and then ask whether the
accused lawyer substantially deviated from the standard practice of
the legal community. Whether the
lawyer deviated from the client's
legitimate expectations or served
the client well is legally irrelevant.
Lawsuits, therefore, cannot fill the
discipline model's gaping holes.
Media exposes have made the
public increasingly aware that lawyer discipline agencies rarely act on
consumer complaints and, when
they do, fail to provide any remedy
to the consumer. Because of the
public relations headaches that
flowed from these exposes, the
legal profession eventually attempted reform by appending several dispute resolution and remedial programs onto the discipline
system. As valiant as attempts to
bridge the remedial gap have been,
they all fall significantly short3from
a consumer's point of view. '
For example, most states have
created statewide or local lawyerclient fee arbitration programs 32 to
deal with the huge number of fee
disputes they receive. However, fee
arbitration programs usually are
Volume 4 Number I/Fall, 1991
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structured to exclude any consideration of the quality of the lawyer's
services in fee-setting, thus circumscribing the kinds of disputes that
can be heard. Also, almost every
state now has a client security
fund, a special fund financed by
lawyers' dues to reimburse clients
who have been victims of lawyer
theft. However, client security
funds are typically limited only to
reimbursement for theft, and regardless of the amount of money
stolen, all funds have caps on the
amount clients can recover. None
of the remedies address neglect in a
way that prompts the lawyer to
remedy the situation. Finally, all of
these programs, if not actually run
by the state bar association, are
controlled and dominated by lawyers. This results in an intimidating system inevitably partial toward lawyers.
A good occupational regulation
scheme should include sanctions
that consist of license-tinkering,
especially a disbarment option for
egregious anti-consumer conduct.
It should also include private rights
of action such as malpractice lawsuits. But these should not be the
only responses. The discipline
model's abdication of responsibility to make sure that consumers
harmed by lawyers have a meaningful remedy is the greatest failing
of the discipline model.
C. The Wrong Process:
Quasi-Criminal
The discipline model's focus on
unethical bad guys, as opposed to
lawyers who fail to keep their end
of the bargain, is also demonstrated by the quasi-criminal apparatus
and process used for acting on
complaints. Even much of the discipline system's terminology is
borrowed from the criminal system. Agencies typically rely on an
indictment-like finding of "probable cause" in deciding which cases
to "prosecute". Upon finding
probable cause that a violation of
the ethical code has occurred, the
agency prosecutor presents the
case at a hearing and later before
the state supreme court. The respondent-attorney has practically
all of the procedural due process
rights of a criminal defendant.
These rights usually include the
Volume 4 Number 1/Fall, 1991

right to a hearing, the right to hear
all testimony, the right to crossexamine the client, and the right to
appeal. Mitigating and aggravating
factors, which argue in favor of
decreasing or increasing a penalty
and are used in criminal sentencing, are likewise considered in deciding what discipline to impose
upon an attorney. For example, a
lawyer's personal and emotional
problems, inexperience, or lack of
a prior discipline record 33 are often
cited as justifications to excuse or
reduce the sanction. On the other
hand, a lawyer's refusal to cooperate with the agency, lack of remorse, or extensive prior disciplinary record 34 often result in the
lawyer receiving the discipline
which 3she
or he originally de5
served.
A complaining client is usually
reduced to the role of complaining
witness, just like a victim of a
crime. Like a crime victim, a
complaining client has far fewer
rights 36 than the person accused.
Although not identical, the relative
position of the parties in the proceeding, the nature and weight of
the interests at stake, 37 and the
resulting lopsided allocation of
procedural rights is roughly the
same in the attorney discipline
process and the criminal process.
Clients are so marginalized that
discipline agencies often neglect to
inform them of important agency
actions such as dismissal of their
complaints or imposition of discipline.

Clients are so marginalized
that discipline agencies often
neglect to inform them of
important agency actions
such as dismissal of their
complaints or imposition
of discipline.
From a consumer's perspective,
however, there are a few significant
deviations from the criminal process that are worth noting. Most
states screen complaints, hold
hearings, and make discipline decisions in secret. In the majority of
states, the case records and information about them become public

only if and when public discipline
is recommended to or imposed by
the state's highest court.38 Because
of the secrecy requirement, half to
three-fourths of all states impose
upon complainants a gag rule that
forbids them from talking with
anyone about the existence or substance of their complaint. 39 There
is no analogue for this gag rule in
the criminal system. In addition,
client complaints that are dismissed, and those that end in private
reprimands, are kept confidential
from the consuming public. Nothing comparable to secret acquittals
and secret sentences exists in the
criminal system. Also, unlike the
criminal justice system's requirement for a speedy trial, discipline
proceedings often continue for
years. 40 Meanwhile, the lawyer is
out "on bond", free to practice and
4
possibly harm more consumers. 1
It would seem, then, that complaining clients suffer from all of
the liabilities of the criminal process yet reap none of its benefits. If
consumer protection is key, lawyer
regulation should not be modelled
after the criminal justice system.
D. The Wrong Regulatory
Structure: Self-Regulation
In every single state, lawyers are
regulated solely by other lawyers.
In many states, the discipline agency is run by the state bar association where the governing board of
the bar is the governing board of
the attorney discipline agency. In
other states the disciplinary agency
is structurally independent of, but
still heavily influenced by the state
bar association. In all cases, however, lawyers dominate the governing boards that make the rules, the
staff that screens complaints, and
the hearing panels that decide
whether to recommend discipline.
Finally, it is lawyer-judges on state
supreme courts who decide whether to impose discipline. Because
state supreme courts in almost
every state have made the power to
regulate lawyers an exclusive power of the courts, 42 the legal profession is beyond the regulatory reach
of state legislatures. Thus, consumers have no input in or control over
discipline policy-making and enforcement.
(continued on page 8)
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There is a built-in conflict of
interest 43 in any system of selfregulation. In the case of lawyer
regulation, the source of this conflict is two-fold. First, a conflict of
interest is inevitable when an agency is charged with protecting the
interests of multiple constituencies
who have opposing interests, or
who have actual disputes with one
another. 44 This conflict is aggravated when the agency is also a trade
association, as is the case with bar
associations. Lawyers' trade associations cannot simultaneously advance the interests of lawyers and
advance the interests of consumers
without sacrificing someone's interests. Unfortunately, it is usually
consumer interests that are sacrificed.
Beyond the conflict of interest
that results from charging an agency with conflicting responsibilities,
a conflict of interest exists in allowing lawyers to regulate other lawyers. There is nothing unique in
this conflict-of-interest criticism of
lawyer self-regulation. Lawyers
may be able to judge other kinds of
disputes between other kinds of
parties impartially, but "[n]o licensed vocation is well situated to
assess the points at which public
'45
and parochial interests diverge.
Aggrieved legal consumers should
not be expected to take their complaints to a panel of lawyers any
more than aggrieved tenants
should be expected to take their
complaints to a panel of landlords.
Nor does oversight of discipline
by state supreme courts cure the
conflict-of-interest problem. Supreme court justices are lawyers;
they may not be currently-practicing lawyers, but they are lawyers
nonetheless. For the most part,
judges are exclusively selected
from lawyers' ranks, and upon
leaving the bench commonly return to law practice. Besides, in
reality, courts are too busy to take
an active hand in regulation and so
they delegate the job to lawyers (in
and out of bar associations)
and
46
defer to their judgment.
The legal profession claims selfregulation is necessary and desirable because "only lawyers know
8

when a fellow lawyer made a mistake," or "lawyers have the highest
stake in getting rid of the bad
apples." If the word "doctor" or

Aggrieved legal consumers
should not be expected
to take their complaints to a
panel of lawyers any more
than aggrieved tenants
should be expected to take
their complaints to a panel
of landlords.
"car manufacturer" was substituted for "lawyer" in these claims,
lawyers would be the first to challenge this conflict of interest.
When it comes to consumers of
legal services, however, the legal
profession instantly becomes blind
to its conflict of interest. Selfregulation results in an obliviousness to consumers which is characteristic of the discipline model.
Ill. The Alternative: A

Consumer Protection Model
From a consumer's point of
view, there is no question but that
the discipline model must be
scrapped, and that a consumer
protection system must take its
place. Under a consumer protection model for regulating lawyers,
the regulatory structure, objectives, responses, and process would
be radically different. When it
comes to lawyer regulation, the bar
usually shudders at hearing lawyers' services compared to the services of auto mechanics or the like,
believing it denigrates the profession. The sad truth, however, is
that despite the importance of legal
services both to individuals' lives
and to the vindication of legal
rights generally, consumers appear
to be better protected when having
a car fixed than when hiring a
lawyer. Lawyers, therefore, should
be regulated more like auto mechanics.
The key question thus becomes,
"What should this new consumer
protection system look like?" The
consumer protection laws, remedies, and processes now available
to consumers in other non-legal
contexts are a starting point. To-

gether with what we already know
about the pitfalls of professional
regulation and the needs of consumers of legal services, it is possible to devise a new model of legal
consumer protection.
Although no state currently has
such a consumer model in place,
the key objectives and attributes of
any adequate replacement are
clear. 47 The agency in charge
should be wholly independent of
the bar, publicly dominated and
publicly accountable, and all of its
operations should be open to public scrutiny. The agency's services
should be accessible to all consumers in terms of cost, user-friendliness, and visibility. In handling
complaints, the agency should be
pro-consumer in orientation but
impartial in deciding disputes. The
process should be speedy and enable the parties to actively participate in dispute resolution. Disputes should be resolved, harm
should be redressed, and the results
or remedies48 should be final and
carried out.
A. The Right Regulatory Structure:
A Publicly-Dominated,
Independent Agency
Because of the inherent conflict
of interest in self-regulation, the
pivotal first step in creating a new
system for regulating lawyers is to
take all consumer protection functions away from lawyers-as individuals, as organized bar associations, or as supreme court
justices-and invest them somewhere else. This could be a new
agency or an existing agency, but
non-lawyers should dominate the
entire regulatory process, from
making the policy that governs the
system to hearing and deciding
complaints. Our entire jury system
rests on the notion that non-experts can and should decide even
the most complex cases.
The same kinds of agencies and
officials who now regulate auto
mechanics, such as state consumer
protection agencies and state attorneys general,49 are obvious candidates for handling lawyer regulation. Some of these agencies have
been criticized as ineffective in
protecting consumer interests, by
lawyers 50 as well as consumer advocates. Much of the time, this is
Volume 4 Number I/Fall, 1991
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because these agencies operate according to the same discipline
model used by attorney regulation
schemes. If a particular state agency has not been effective, consumer advocates and the public are
generally aware of it. Thus, they
can decide whether to reform an
existing agency or to form a new
one. More important, placing lawyer regulation firmly within the
legislature's power would provide
a measure of public accountability
which is currently absent. Legislative regulation of lawyers cannot
guarantee consumers a perfect system, but it would guarantee them
recourse if reforms are needed.
Similarly, in pressing for new
enabling legislation, advocates can
decide whether existing consumer
protection statutes could simply be
amended to cover legal services, 5'
or whether to pass a whole new
law. State "unfair and deceptive
acts and practices ("UDAP")"
laws already cover a multitude of
unfair advertising, contract, and
other business practices in other
settings.12 To the extent that such
laws are not adequate to cover the
full range of client expectations
and meet consumer needs53 however, the agency could adopt specific regulations relating to lawyers. Whether a new law is passed
or an old one is amended, new
rules for defining and governing
the lawyer-client relationship are
necessary.
B. The Right Objectives: Consumer
Rights
Obviously, it is possible to have
pro-consumer laws against theft,
fraud, or misrepresentation without a code of professional ethics.
After all, consumers are able to
secure important rights in their
transactions with banks, auto mechanics, and others without ethical
codes. For instance, the duty to
keep client confidences could easily be replaced with a duty to
preserve a customer's privacy, a
duty which is imposed on banks
and many other businesses. Current restrictions on client solicitation, which purportedly exist to
prevent lawyers from placing undue pressure on prospective clients, could be replaced with telemarketing-like rules on disclosure,
Volume 4 Number l/Fall, 1991

cooling-off periods (permitting
consumers to cancel a contract
after they have had time to "cooloff" from a high-pressure sales
pitch) and fraud.
Instead of attempting to identify
and weed out unethical behavior,
the prime objective of a consumer
protection model should be to enforce legitimate consumer expectations as to cost, promptness, and
quality of service. Right now, these
expectations are not enforced either in the form of consumer rights
or ethical obligations. The consumer protection model would
view a lawyer's treatment of the
client and the lawyer's performance of the contract as a business
transaction. Like a business transaction, the lawyer's services would
be defined and scrutinized according to reasonable client expectations enacted into law as express
consumer rights and according to
the contract itself.

The prime objective of a
consumer protection model
should be to enforce
legitimate consumer
expectations as to cost,
promptness, and quality
of service.
Legal consumers should be entitled, by law, to receive accurate
and full disclosure of pertinent
information in advance of hiring a
lawyer. Consumers cannot be expected to make intelligent hiring
decisions unless they know all the
facts up-front. They need easy access to information, both from the
consumer protection agency and
from the lawyers themselves. Lawyers should be required to make
several disclosures to potential clients prior to being retained. An
attorney should offer a summary of
the client's options for attaining
her or his objectives, including the
chances of success, time, and cost
associated with each. The client
should receive a description of the
process for authorizing, calculating
and billing fees and other costs.
The lawyer should disclose the
specific services to be performed,
the person expected to perform
them, and the level of service qual-

ity to be provided.5 4 Finally, the
client should know how changes in
circumstances and disputes are to
be handled. Although much of this
information might initially be given orally, these disclosures and
decisions should be incorporated
into a plain-language, written contract5 5 soon after the client decides
to retain the attorney. Although
this process would serve to reduce
confusion and disputes, lawyers
should also be required to inform
clients how and where they can
register a complaint
about the law56
yer's services.
Further, the consumer should
have rights to ongoing control of
the terms of the bargain. For instance, consumers should have the
right to make all important decisions about the case. Importance
should be determined by what a
reasonable client would consider
important. The client should have
the right to set parameters on time,
cost, and courses of conduct requiring the attorney to obtain the
client's permission before exceeding them.5 7 Finally, the client
should be able to fire an attorney or
to file a complaint without intimi58
dation or other adverse action.
These rights, whether enacted
into law or adopted by administrative rulemaking, should also include provisions which insure that
consumers are aware of and are
able to exercise their rights to
control the attorney-client transaction. It is not unusual for service
providers to be required to give
customers important disclosures
about their rights. For example,
airlines must notify customers
about their rights in the event of
overbooking, and credit card companies must notify customers of
the process for disputing a charge.
Likewise, lawyers should be required not only to provide itemized billings of time and expenses,
but also to inform clients, on the
face of the lawyer's bill, of their
right to control those costs and the
process for handling a dispute.
In addition to protecting consumer rights to information and
control, the law should also address attorney attentiveness and
quality of service. For instance,
the consumer should have the stat(continued on page 10)
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utory right to receive regular progress reports and to have phone calls
returned within a specified reasonable time. 59 Missing deadlines, as
well as less blatant forms of neglect, such as taking too long to
probate an estate or asking for too
many continuances due to an excessive caseload, should also be
proscribed.
Statutory prohibitions on negligent and incompetent service, in
particular, would benefit the consumer. However, to be meaningful
and helpful to consumers, the standard of care to which lawyers are
held accountable would have to be
changed from the reasonable lawyer's perspective to the reasonable
client's perspective. The standard
would thus become, "what would
the reasonable client under these
circumstances have a legitimate
right to expect?" Deviance from
consumer expectations about quality would be the touchstone, instead of deviance from prevailing
lawyer practice. 60 If the courts can
posit how a reasonable attorney
exercising due care should act,
agencies and courts should be able
to posit what a reasonable client
hiring an attorney would expect.

Deviance from consumer
expectations about quality
would be the touchstone,
instead of deviance from
prevailing lawyer practice.
A shift in focus to the expectations of a reasonable client is a step
toward adequate reform, but it is
not the end. Still to be determined
is whether 6there should be a single
"uniform" ' standard or instead,
many standards that could take
into account specialty, 62 the type of
service provider involved, 63 or
even the contract itself.64 Client
complaints made to discipline
agencies about negligence and incompetence might prove to be a
fertile starting place for defining
the standard. Whatever standard
that is developed would be refined
through the adjudication of complaints.
10

C. The Right Response: Adequate
Remedies for Harm
Clients need ready access to a
hospitable forum where their
grievances are aired and a serious
effort is made to resolve and remedy them. For "the aggrieved consumer, the important personal
remedy is neither the preventing of
future deceptive acts and practices
nor the punishment of the misfeasor, but rather restitution for his
particular injury. The injured consumer wants either his money's
worth or his money back with a
'65
minimum of expense and time.
The availability of quick remedial
action for the type of problems
clients most often experience constitutes one of the most significant
advantages of the consumer protection model.
An emphasis on dispute resolution and remedial action does not
mean license-tinkering would completely disappear. The power to
disbar a lawyer for very egregious
conduct should continue to be a
part of the agency's panoply of
regulatory responses. But, such action would be rare with the addition of remedies and the reversal in
emphasis from criminal-like conduct to contract-like complaints.
Unfair business practices injunctions and similar legal strategies
which can result in the shut down
of a business are wholly compatible
with enforcement of consumer
protection laws, yet carry none of
the conceptual or operational baggage of discipline.
Certainly, when a lawyer's poor
performance harms a client, compensation for damages should be
available to that client. Harming a
client is a clearly foreseeable result
of negligent performance. If the
customer elects arbitration instead
of a lawsuit, 66 however, only contract-like compensatory damage
awards should be allowed. That is,
only damage awards for actual
losses and consequential damages
should be available. Traditionally
in contract law, punitive and other
non-economic damages are considered inappropriate for breach of
contract, presumably because the
injury is usually a purely financial
one. One of the aims of the consumer protection model is to take
lawyer-client relations out of the

realm of ethics and place them
squarely in the marketplace. If a
consumer views her or his injury
more like a betrayal of trust, that
consumer would remain free to sue
for malpractice and to try for a
non-economic damage award.

One of the aims of the
consumer protection model is
to take lawyer-client relations
out of the realm of ethics
and place them squarely
in the marketplace.
In addition to providing damages for poor service, the agency
should also be empowered to adjust fees when service is of poor
quality but does not lead to con-

crete loss. 6 7 For example, just as
consumers can expect to receive a
discount on a dented but otherwise
usable appliance, legal consumers
should be able to receive a discount
if an attorney fails to complete the
work on time. The ability to get a
fee reduced or voided may be
sufficient in most cases. Forms of
overcharge, such as wrongly withheld retainers, payments for unnecessary work or services, or
charges for work never performed,
should be refunded.
Using alternative dispute resolution techniques in an administrative setting offers tremendous potential for developing innovative,
responsive remedies. For example,
if a lawyer fails to complete the
promised services, the agency
could quickly order specific performance or a refund. Further, in
contrast to reprimands for minor
misconduct, the agency could impose fines with minimal procedural hassles. Fines for relatively minor violations of consumer
protection laws, especially in cases
where the client has suffered aggravation rather than economic loss,
are a potentially
useful enforce68
ment tool.
D. The Right Process: Alternative
Dispute Resolution
A system of dispute resolution
and remedial functions responsive
to consumer needs requires several
important features. First and foremost, consumers of legal services
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need access to an out-of-court forum for handling their complaints.
Besides being hard to bring and
win, lawsuits give lawyers the unfair advantage of playing on the
home court. Lawyers possess
knowledge of the players and technical rules, cost advantages by being able to represent themselves,
and the confidence that flows from
knowing that an opponent-the
client-has none of those advantages. 69 The greater speed with
which an out-of-court forum is able
to render a decision also helps
minimize any advantage lawyers
may try to gain through delay.

Consumers of legal services
need access to an
out-of-court forum for
handling their complaints.
Second, an out-of-court forum
should have the power to mediate
disputes on an informal basis. In
mediation, the parties have an opportunity to work out a solution
among themselves, quickly and inexpensively. This is especially effective for disputing parties who
must or wish to maintain an ongoing business relationship. It also
permits the parties flexibility in
arriving at solutions. Because of
these and several other advantages,
mediation is now widely used to
resolve consumer disputes in nonlegal areas.
However, if no agreement can be
reached, consumers will need access to an effective, fair, and final
solution to their problem. Thus, a
special branch of the consumer
protection agency should also be
empowered to conduct mandatory
and binding arbitration. Under
such an arrangement, the lawyer
would be required to participate at
the client's option, and the result
would bind both parties, appealable only for procedural irregularities.7 0
Like mediation, arbitration is
also widely available to resolve
consumer disputes. However, because many of the available programs have been sponsored by the
industry against which consumers
lodge their complaints, 7' consumers have not always found them to
Volume 4 Number 1/Fall, 1991

be fair and effective. 72 Consumers
deserve a neutral, if not an overtly
pro-consumer, forum in which to
resolve their grievances. Thus, the
process must be housed in a neuagency, using lay
tral, third party
73
arbitrators.
IV. Conclusion/Epilogue
When the ABA's McKay Commission was formed, it announced
74
it would hold a series of four
public hearings. HALT, a consumer organization advocating legal
reform, notified its membership
and ran newspaper ads informing
the public of the opportunity to
testify. For the first hearing on
February 10, 1990, in Los Angeles,
the Commission staff was so deluged with advance calls from consumers wanting to sign up to testify
that the staff began telling consumers the schedule was full. The consumers came anyway, and the
hearing, originally scheduled for a
few hours, lasted all day.
The Commission allowed local
bar officials to testify first and at
length about the recent cosmetic
reforms they had adopted under
protest. Eventually, most of the
nearly 150 consumers in attendance were able to testify. While
solicitous to the bar officials, the
commissioners grilled the consumers to determine whether they indeed had legitimate complaints.
By the time of the second hearing in New York City, the Commission had already made some
changes. More time was scheduled
to permit consumers to testify, and
the Commission arranged to have
local bar officials present to accept
consumers' complaints. More important, the commission decided
to expand the scope of its inquiry;
instead of looking just at the progress made since the first ABA
study, it decided to assess how well
discipline was meeting the public
need by looking at other models of
occupational regulation.
The tables had turned by the
final two hearings. The Commission welcomed the consumers who
testified, apologized to them for
any poor treatment they received,
and thanked them for stepping
forward. This time the local bar
officials were sharply questioned
about why their discipline systems

secretly dismissed more than ninety percent of all consumer complaints.
The hundreds of consumers who
participated in the McKay Commission's hearings had a dramatic
impact. The National Organization of Bar Counsel-the national
group of lawyer discipline prosecutors-issued its own report and
recommendations in September,
1990. That report repeated many
of the recommendations HALT
had made earlier in its own report.
The most significant of these recommendations included: (1) creating alternatives to discipline by
expanding redress; (2) creating an
independent, voluntary panel of
mediators to handle minor complaints; (3) making the process
more open to the public; (4) increasing public participation; (5)
improving the agency's visibility
and accessibility; and (6) imposing
stricter deadlines on agency action.7 5
In May, 1991, the McKay Commission followed suit, adopting
roughly seventy-five percent of the
reforms HALT and consumers had
urged. The McKay Commission
recommended a fully open disciplinary process-opening up complaints from the moment they are
filed, making hearings open to the
public, increasing public representation on grievance panels, abolishing the gag rule on complainants, and getting rid of private
reprimands. It also recommended
increasing consumers' rights in the
process by granting consumers absolute immunity from retaliatory
lawsuits, giving consumers an opportunity to rebut the lawyer's story before the complaint is dismissed, and giving consumers the right
to appear and testify at hearings.
Most important, the Commission
recommended expanding the
scope of public protection to include mandatory fee arbitration,
voluntary malpractice arbitration,
and mediation.
The McKay Commission recommended that disciplinary functions be taken away from bar associations, but it did not support
abolishing lawyer self-regulation.
Instead, it adamantly endorsed
giving state supreme courts "direct
(continued on page 12)
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and exclusive control" 7 6 over discipline. Further, it referred to continued bar involvement in remedial programs, such as fee arbitration
and client security funds, as wholly
desirable and appropriate.
Although the Commission made
several pro-consumer recommendations, it certainly did not dispose
of the discipline model for regulating lawyers. For instance, although
it conceded that "the great majority of complaints against lawyers,
while stating legitimate grounds
for dispute, do not allege facts
constituting misconduct, ' 77 and
that the system needed to respond
to a wider range of complaints, it
clung to the notion that "[d]etecting unethical behavior must remain the highest priority.... -78
Similarly, although the Commission agreed that complaints about
malpractice and conduct just short
of malpractice needed a remedy, it
recommended that such programs
be voluntary rather than mandatory, thereby making consumer remedies optional.
This ordering of priorities was
also reflected in the recommendation to retain self-regulation. Responding to consumer concerns
about bias, the Commission agreed
the discipline function of determing lawyer ethical violations
should be removed from bar associations. However, the Commission then proceeded to expressly
approve of bar associations maintaining control over all other kinds
of complaints. Because the vast
majority of complaints fall into
this latter category, the Commission's recommendation would
leave the bar in charge of more
than ninety percent of consumer
complaints. If the bar is to remain
in charge of anything, consumers
would prefer it to be in charge of
the ten percent of complaints involving ethical violations and not
the other ninety percent of complaints brought by consumers.
Putting aside the conflict of interest in court regulation, the Commission also ignored the reality
that court regulation is actually
lawyer and bar regulation. The
Commission's own survey of state

high court justices found that
,'most were not aware of the many
problems we have discovered." 7 9
Conceding that the Court must
delegate day-to-day administration
of the system, the Commission
then fails to identify to whom the
court should delegate the responsibility. Since a publicly-controlled
governing board is nowhere mentioned, it can be assumed that it
will be a lawyer-dominated board,
composed of bar association nominees or appointees.
HALT reacted to the report with
measured praise. It hailed many of
the specific recommendations as
pro-consumer and bemoaned the
likelihood that the recommendations would be sabotaged by selfregulation and lawyers' conflict of
interest. The bar, however, immediately objected to the proposed
elimination of secrecy.80 The purported concern about ruining innocent lawyers' reputations with unfounded complaints continues
unabated. Lawyers have given little or no attention to any of the
other recommendations, including
the addition of remedial programs.
The bar's narrow focus on secrecy demonstrates in the clearest
possible terms the conflict of interest and the kind of obstacles to real
reform inherent in self-regulation.
The fact that the bar has totally
ignored what consumers would
consider core recommendations is
striking evidence in support of the
need to adopt the remainder of
HALT's recommendations to eliminate self-regulation.
The McKay Report will be voted
on very soon by the ABA House of
Delegates. If it approves the recommendations, it will place the
weight of its authority and influence behind them and lobby the
states to adopt them. The author
predicts, however, that many of the
recommendations, especially those
on which the profession's interests
directly conflict with consumers',
will be watered down or disappear
altogether. More to the point, even
if the ABA endorses the entire
report, the power to make actual
reforms remains with the lawyerrun agencies that have resisted
reform in the past.
The consumer model for regulating lawyers is the appropriate

standard for evaluating the ABA's
report. Consumers will not be satisfied with anything less than a real
consumer protection agency. The
consumer protection model is the
blueprint for reform that consumer
advocates should continue to pursue, regardless of the ABA's actions.
Author's Note: On February 4,
1992, the American Bar Association's House of Delegates considered and voted on the McKay Commission recommendations. As
expected, the House voted to retain
the ABA's current policy of maintainingsecrecy untilprobablecause
of ethical misconduct is found.
With hardly any debate, however, it
formally recognized the need for
consumer rights and consumer protection. For the first time, the
House agreed that consumerprotection mechanisms should be created
to address the 90-95 percent of
consumer complaints that are currently dismissed. It also adopted
the recommendation to take discipline functions away from bar associations, although the courts would
retain control. Finally, in stark
contrast to the follow-up ordered
after the firstABA report,the House
did not approve a major effort by
the ABA to encourage states to
adopt reforms. Instead, it suggested
that states set up theirown commissions to study reforms.
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world.... This is not to say that redistribution [of] highest-quality legal services
should not be pursued as far as possible, but a uniform competence standard
will not solve problems that ultimately
must be traced to the unequal distribution of societal resources." Garth, supra
note 25, at 669-70.
Although several states require contingency fee agreements to be in writing,
only a few states require lawyers to use
written contracts for non-contingency
cases. HALT, "Does Your Legal Sys-

tem Make the Grade?,"

THE LEGAL

14,18 (July-Sept., 1990).
56 In some states, lawyers must notify
clients of their right to take a fee
dispute to fee arbitration before being
able to file a collection suit against the
client. See, Fee Arbitration Survey, supra note 32 at Appendix I.
57 Auto mechanics are routinely required
to give an oral or written estimate of the
cost of repair, and must obtain the
customer's permission to exceed it.
UDAP, supranote 51 at 180.
58 Although attorneys are not supposed to
retaliate against clients who express
REFORMER,
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dissatisfaction in these ways, consumers regularly report to HALT that they
do. Retaliation, for such challenges as
questioning a lawyer's bill, questioning
a lawyer's strategy, is all too common.
Clients report that retaliation most often takes the form of "backing off" the
client's case, i.e., not trying hard. Because of the fear their lawyer will
abandon them, directly or indirectly,
clients often wait until the relationship
sours completely before taking any
action. See, Steele & Nimmer, supra
note 6, at 960.
Laws that enforce legitimate and reasonable consumer expectations as to
service exist in other business contexts. For example, California recently
enacted a law which requires repair
services to estimate their arrival time
and actually show up within a limited
time period or be liable for the damages
to the customer. Cal. Civ. Code §
1722(a)(1) (West Supp. 1992). Prof.
Lerman proposes a disciplinary rule
requiring a lawyer to "respond to a
client call within two business days
after receiving it," or make arrangements for someone else to respond.
Lerman, supra note 43, at 756. The
requirement is unfortunately framed as
an ethical obligation rather than a
straightforward legal right, but Prof.
Lerman is definitely on the right track in
her attempt to make the rules governing lawyers meet consumer needs.
There is at least one precedent for a
consumer-oriented standard of care in
the law of professional malpractice.
See, Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d
772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1064 (1972) (adequacy of disclosure by doctor is judged by determining
what a reasonable patient would want
to know before making medical treatment decision). See also, Martyn, supra
note 7, at 732-33 ("[C]ommon law
malpractice standards seem to be moving away from exclusive reliance on
professional definitions of the requisite
standard of care.")
But, see, discussion supra note 54,
regarding the futility of assuming lawyers can provide "uniform" standards
of service.
The author has the opinion, shared by
many others, that there is no such thing
as general competence. "Attorneys
may practice in more than one area
competently, but no attorney can practice competently in a substantial number of the twenty-odd specialties which
have evolved. ...What the state really
tests is general aptitude, not [general
competence]." Robert C. Fellmeth, A
Theory of Regulation, 5 CALIF. REGULATORY L. RPTR. 3, 14 (1985). Standards of
competence, then, may need to be
developed according to the specialized
area of law being practiced or the legal
task being performed.
Would clients expect the same level of
quality from a lawyer and a nonlawyer
provider such as an independent paralegal? Should they?
"Two general approaches to evaluating
competence can be outlined.... [T]he
profession's model, which is based
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largely on a uniform, professionally
enforced ideal ....[and t]he other, im-

plicit in the critique of traditional professionalism, is based on contract and the
competition of the marketplace."
Garth, supra note 25, at 668. "If the
client can bargain for a particular level
of services, negligence can no longer
be determined simply by referring to
what a typical practitioner would have
done.... Increasingly the question will
be whether the lawyer was negligent
under the circumstances established in
the bargain with the client, a more
complex and difficult question to resolve." Id.
at 675.
65 Robert C. Mussehl, The Neighborhood
Consumer Center: Relief for the Consumer at the Grass-Roots Level, 47

yer's participation is voluntary, or the
result is non-binding, do not work for
consumers. Lawyers can too easily
force the client into court merely by
refusing to participate in the first place
or by appealing the decision afterward.
See, Fee Arbitration Rules, supra note
31, at 13, for a discussion of this
problem in the context of lawyer-client
fee arbitration.
71 "Consumer Action Panels [CAPs] ...
have been set up on a national level by
the major appliance industry, the carpet
and rug industry, and the funeral industry; they have been established for the
automobile dealers at the state and
local levels. " Dean W. Determan, Forums for Resolving Conflict: Considerations for the Private Sector, in A.B.A.

NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1093,1129 (1972).

66 Arbitration should be available in addition to, not instead of, private rights of
action. There is no consumer advantage in cutting off access to existing
remedial routes, no matter how inaccessible they are. However, to encourage finality, if the customer elects
arbitration, the arbitration result should
be binding and no civil action should be
permitted based on the same complaint.
67 Garth, supra note 25, at 676 (suggesting a client ought to pay less for
substandard service that does not result in financial damage).
68 Fines have been suggested by several
others, including Martyn, supra note 7,
at 732, and the Chicago Council of
Lawyers, Report on Investigation of the
Operation of the Attorney Registration
and Disciplinary Commission, at 39-40
(Feb. 1978). For example, in addition to
other enforcement tools, fines might be
appropriate for lawyers who fail to
make required disclosures, return client calls, or use a written contract.
Fines have the additional advantage of
helping to finance the operations of the
consumer protection agency.
69 For these reasons, exclusive reliance
on lawsuits of any sort to enforce
consumer rights is problematic for consumers. One of the problems with the
strategy of just extending UDAP statutes to lawyers is that lawsuits are
often required in order to enforce them.
Frequently, the consumer can bring a
private action, but some statutes require the consumer to rely upon a
government agency to bring the action,
further diminishing the chances that the
consumer's complaint will be addressed. A similar problem arises with
just extending the jurisdiction of existing consumer protection agencies to
handle complaints about legal services,
rather than creating a new agency.
Some agencies, especially Attorneys
General, are not set up to handle ADR,
but only to handle lawsuits. But see,
John Cooley, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Consumer Protection: An
'Odd-Couple' Thriving in the Offices of
State Attorneys General, 1 Loy. CONSUMER L. RPTR. 1 (1988) (increasing
utilization of ADR together with law
enforcement by attorneys general).
70 Arbitration programs in which the law-

SPEC. COMM. ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION, CONSUMER DISPUTE RESOLUTION: EXPLORING THE ALTERNATIVES, at

39 (1983).
72 Garth, supra note 25, at 678 (citing
Eaton, The Better Business Bureau:
The Voice of the People in the Market-

place, in No ACCESS

TO LAw

233 (1980),

for the proposition that consumers
have fared poorly in all industry-sponsored arbitration); Accord, Gregg, supra note 43; Charlotte Newton, A
Consumer's View of Third Party Mechanisms, in A.B.A. SPEC. COMM. ON ALTERNATIVE

DISPUTE
RESOLUTION,
CONSUMER DISPUTE RESOLUTION: ExPLORING THE ALTERNATIVES, at 45 (1983)
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("Many consumer advocates criticize
[industry-sponsored] efforts as ineffective and look upon them as windowdressing."). HALT has found that barrun lawyer-client fee arbitration programs suffer from this same defect.
Fee Arbitration Rules, supra note 31.
Other features that increase arbitration's responsiveness and user-friendliness for consumers include strict
deadlines for holding hearings and issuing decisions, and a ban on using
formal rules of evidence or procedure
in arbitration hearings. For a fuller
discussion of these features, see Fee
Arbitration Rules, supra note 31.
The Commission later decided to add a
fifth hearing in Portland, Oregon to
focus on the issue of secrecy in lawyer
discipline. Portland was chosen because Oregon is the only state that
opens complaints to public scrutiny
from the moment they are filed.
National Organization of Bar Counsel,
Recommendations to American Bar
Association Commission on Evaluation
of Disciplinary Enforcement (Sept.
1990).
McKay Report, supra note 50, at 19.
Id.
at 16.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 6.
In the press coverage and formal bar
gatherings that followed the report's
issuance, secrecy was the issue for
lawyers. See, e.g., "Panel: End Disciplinary Secrecy," A.B.A. J. at 18 (Aug.
1991); "Call for Disciplinary Reform,"
NAT'L L.J., at 1 (June 3, 1991); "ABA
Panel Calls on Lawyers to Open Discipline," WASH. POST, at Al (May 22,
1991).
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